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[Sac. No. 7615. In Bank. Mar. I, 1965.] 
THE PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT 
OF SACRAMENTO COUNTY, Respondent; DYKE 
WATER COMPANY, Real Party in Interest. 
[1] Public Utilities-Exercise of Jurisdiction by Oommission-
Judicial Oontrol.-Under Pub. UtiI. Code, § 1759, providing 
that only the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review or 
annul orders of the Public Utilities Commission, to delay the 
operation thereof, or to enjoin performance by the commission 
of its official duties, a superior court had no jurisdiction to 
proceed with an action brought by a water company to obtain 
a declaration of rights with respect to the refunding of money 
collected by the company from its customers pursuant to a 
stay order of the commission where the whole matter of how 
refunds were to be made was still pending and undecided be-
fore the commission and the water company was obligated by 
a flnal commission order to present a plan for making refunds. 
PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the Superior 
Court of Sacramento County from proceeding with an action 
seeking a declaration of rights and duties with respect to cer-
tain funds collected by a water company pursuant to a stay 
order of the Public Utilities Commission. Writ granted. 
Richard E. Tuttle and J. Thomason Phelps for Petitioner. 
No appearance for Respondent. 
Thomas W. Martin and Lally & Martin for Real Party in 
Interest. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-The Public Utilities Commission, suing 
in the name of the People of the State of California (Pub. 
Util. Code, § 2101), seeks a writ of prohibition to restrain 
respondent superior court from proceeding with an action 
wherein Dyke Water Company, the real party in interest 
herein, seeks a declaration of the rights and duties of the 
parties with respect to funds collected by Dyke from its cus-
tomers pursuant to a stay order of the commission. 
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Public Utilities and Services, § 124 et seq.; 
Am.Jur., Public Utilities and Services (1st ed § 221). 
MeX. Dig. Reference: [1] Public Utilities, § 60(2). 
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In 1960 the commission ordered the termination of an in·;4 
terim rate increase previously granted to Dyke. Pending a ::-,' 
review by this court, the commission stayed the effective date ;: 
of the termination order, but directed Dyke to set up a reserve-~ 
'account in its books and deposit the amounts collected pursu.::: 
ant to the stay with a bank as trustee. On July 25, 1961, after~, 
this court affirmed the termination order (Dyke Water Co. v. ~' 
Public Ut'lUties Com., 56 Ca1.2d 105 [14 Cal.Rptr. 310, 363 
P.2d 326]), the commission ordered the lower rates into effect 
immediately and directed Dyke within 10 days to formulate ' 
and advise the commission of a plan to refund to its customers 
the difference between the higher and lower rates collected 
while the commission's stay was in effect. , , , 
In November 1962 the commission issued an order to show ' 
cause why Dyke and its officers and directors should not be 
held in contempt for violating various final orders of the 
, commission including those directing Dyke to set up a reserve 
account, to establish a trust deposit, and to formulate a plan 
for refunding the excess charges collected pursuant to the 
commission's stay. 
, While the contempt proceedings were pending, the commis-
, sion commenced an investigation of a proposed sale by Dyke ',1 
-of part of its operative property to the City of Anaheim. Iii '::'1: 
a decision filed on August 6,. 1~63 (Dyke Wate,. Co., 6~ C!ll= :::,'_,',: 
,P.U.C. 315, 322), the conmusslon found that the public m·'~~ 
-terest required that approval of the proposed sale be con':-'} 
ditioned on Dyke's making provision for refunds to its cus-'.', 
tomers of the amounts collected pursuant to the stay in the ,,' ~ 
rate proceedings. The commission also determined that - ;',1 
$266,342 should be placed in escrow for this purpose, but with. ~ 
out prejudice to Dyke's right to pursue its contention before :1 
the commission that no refunds were due. ' 
Pursuant to this decision Dyke deposited $266,342 in a trust 1 
account with the Farmers and Merchants Bank of Long Beach ' 
and executed escrow instructions providing that this amount 
was to be disbursed as the commission should direct and :i 
that the escrow instructions should not be changed without 
the consent of the commission. 
On December 9, 1963, Dyke filed its action for declaratory 
relief in respondent superior court. Its complaint alleges 
that defendant Silva claims that he is entitled to part of the 
refunds as assignee of some of Dyke's customers, that a 
substantial part of the refunds will never be claimed by cus-
tomers, and that defendant Attorney General claims that 
, 
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part of the refunds for the State of California. Dyke denies 
the claims of both Silva and the Attorney General, and it 
prays for a declaration of the rights and duties of the parties 
under the decisions and orders of the commission. 
On July 10,1964, the commission filed its decision and order 
in the contempt proceedings finding Dyke and its officers and 
directors guilty of contempt for six violations of commission 
orders including the order to formulate a plan for making 
refunds. While a petition to review the contempt order was 
pending in this court, the commission commenced the present 
proceeding for a writ of prohibition. On November 19, 1964, 
we denied the petition to review the contempt order (Dyke 
Water Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, S.F. No. 21828), but 
enforcement of that order has been stayed pending the timely 
filing and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari in 
the United States Supreme Court. 
Section 1759 of the Public Utilities Code provides: "No 
court of this State, except the Supreme Court to the extent 
specified in this article, shall have jurisdiction to review, re-
verse, correct, or annul any order or decision of the commis-
sion or to suspend or delay tIle execution or operation thereof, 
or to enjoin, restrain, or interfere with the commission in the 
performance of its official duties, except that the writ of 
mandamus shall lie from the Supreme Court to the commis-
sion in all proper cases. " 
[1] The commission contends that Dyke seeks to have the 
superior court review the commission's decisions and orders 
with respect to making refunds to Dyke's customers and annul 
those decisions to the extent that Dyke seeks a declaration 
that it is entitled to retain the unclaimed refunds. Accordingly, 
the commission concludes that section 1759 deprives the su-
perior court of jurisdiction and that therefore a writ of pro-
hibition should issue. 
Dyke contends that it is not asking the superior court to 
review, annul or delay execution of any order or decision of 
the commission and that it seeks only a determination of two 
questions of law that have arisen under the commission's 
orders in disputes between Dyke and third parties. Those 
questions are alleged to be whether claims for refunds are as-
signable and whether unclaimed refunds are payable to the 
state. 
Had Dyke complied with the commission's order to formu-
late a plan for making refunds to its customers and secured 
J 
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the commission's approval thereof, the appropriate trial:, 
courts would have jurisdiction to adjudicate any disputes be;l 
tween Dyke and third parties arising under the plan. (Coasf] 
Truck Line v. Asbury Truck Co., 218 Cal. 337, 339 [23 P.2d,,~ 
513] ; Henderson v. Oro1J'tlle-Wyandotte Irr. Dist., 207 Cal>~;' 
215,219 [277 P. 487] ; Independent Laundry v. Railroad Com.,'~':; 
70 Cal.App.2d 816, 826 [161 P.2d 827].) By giving proper,'; 
~ffect to an approved refund plan, the courts in such actionS;: 
would be acting not in derogation but in aid of the commis": ,'{ 
sion's jurisdiction.n 
Dyke, however, has not complied with the commission's:~ 
order to formulate a plan for making refunds, and in its "5 
declaratory relief action it seeks advance determinationof.J 
issues that should be presented to the commission in connec- 'i*'J 
tion with any proposed plan. Since no refund plan has been,E 
presented to it, the commission has not ruled on the questions::~ 
of assignability or escheat or considered what the provisions':::~ 
of a refund plan should be. Moreover, the parties have not" 
briefed or argued those questions in this proceeding. Ac~ 
cordingly, it would be premature for us to consider them at 
this time or to determine whether the commission in the exer~ 
cise of its broad powers to regulaie the relationsllip of 'ri. :;'.' 
utility to its customers (Pub. Util. Code, §§ 728, 729, 701)'-:';: 
has authority to determine whether or not refund claimsar~ ':t~ 
, assignable (cf. Pub. Util. Code, § 734) and to whom unclaimed' -
refunds should be paid. (Cf. Market St. By. Co. v. Railroad 
Com.,28 Ca1.2d 363, 366-367 [171 P.2d 875].) , 
. .~ ::';-'i~ 
'The controlling facts are that the whole matter of }ww r{~' 
funds are to be made is still pending and undecided before-_ 
the commission and Dyke is obligated by a final order of tlii{:" 
commission to present a plan for making refunds.Und('l~ :';' 
these circumstances section 1759 precludes the superior court ?~ .. 
from adjudicating at Dyke's behest the very issues that wiJI -":i~ 
necessarily be presented to the commission in the continuinfl ~ 
exercise of its jurisdiction in the refund proceedings. (M illr.r ~1 
v. Railroad Com., 9 Ca1.2d 190. 195 [70 P.2d 164, 112 A.L.R. :)~ 
221] ; Northwestern Pac. R.R. Co. v. 8u1!erior Oourt, 34 Ca1.2d ,-,,~ 
454, 458 [211 P.2d 571] ; see also Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. ~~ 
8uperwr Court, 60 Ca1.2d 426, 428-430 [34 Cal.Rptr. 673, 386 _~ 
P.2d 233] ; Southern Pac. Co. v. Public UUlities Com.~ 41 Cal. ,,~ 
2d 354, 360 [260 P.2d 70] ; Lotlstalot v. Superior Oourt, 30 )1 
Cal.2d 905, 911-913 [186 P.2d 673].) ;:~ 
Let a peremptory writ issue as prayed. 
) 
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Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Burke, J., and Schauer, J.,. 
concurred. 
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. In my opiniont respondent court 
has jurisdiction to determine the issues involved in the com-
plaint for declaratory relief. 
Section 1759 of the Public Utilities Code provides: "No 
court of this State, except the Supreme Court to the extent 
specified in this article, shall have jurisdiction to review, re-
verse, correct, or annul any order or decision of the commis-
sion or to suspend or delay the execution or operation thereof, 
or to enjoin, restrain, or interfere with the commission in the 
performance of its official duties, except that the writ of man-
damus shall lie from the Supreme Court to the commission in 
all proper cases." 
If the present action required a determination respecting 
the validity of the commission's orders and decisions directing 
the real party in interest to make the refunds, respondent 
court would therefore lack jurisdiction to proceed. 
The issues raised by the pleadings, however, are whether 
defendant Silva, as assignee, is entitled to receive the refund 
deposits assigned to him and whether the state is entitled to 
receive any unclaimed refund deposits. The issue of the 
validity of the commission's orders and decisions directing 
that the refunds be made has not been raised. 
As the pleadings stand, respondent court would simply be 
called upon to pass on the merits of defendant Silva's and 
the state's claims and to determine what rights and duties are 
imposed upon the respective parties by the applicable orders 
and decisions of the commission. Accordingly, respondent 
court would not be required to "review, reverse, correct, or 
annul any order or decision of the commission." (Cf. H en-
derson v. Oroville-Wyandotte Irr. Dist., 207 Cal. 215, 219 
[277 P. 487]; Independent Laundry v. Railroad Oom., 70 
Cal.App.2d 816, 826 [5b] [161 P.2d 827].) 
In Miller v. Railroad Com., 9 Ca1.2d 190, 195 [1] [70 P.2d 
164, 112 A.L.R. 221], we said: ". . . after the commission 
11as assumed jurisdiction over a public utility for the purpose 
of administering the law applicable to the activities of the 
utility, the commission has exclusive jurisdiction over the 
regulation and control of said utility .... " 
*Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assign-
ment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council. 
) 
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This is not to say, howe'\rer, that the commission thereby'~ 
obtains jurisdiction to determine the claims of third persons ' 
against such utility, even though such claims relate to a' 
matter over which the commission has assumed jurisdiction.: 
(Hempy v. Public Utilities Oom., 56 Ca1.2d 214, 217-218 [14 ' 
Cal.~ptr. ~~~, 363 P.2d 476] ; Oalifornia Water &- Tel. 00. v. I' Publ~c Uhlltus Com., 51 Cal.2d 478, 488 [334 P.2d 887].) : 
On the contrary, under section 2106 of the Public Utilities 
Code,· jurisdiction over actions to recover for any loss, dam-
age, or injury suffered by third persons as a result of any . 
unlawful act of a public utility or a failure by it to perform ' 
acts required by law or by any order or decision of the com-
mission is specifically given to the courts. 
Accordingly, any person entitled to a refund under the 
commission's orders and decisions hereinabove referred to 
would have the right, if the real party in interest failed to 
make payment, to file an action on his claim in the appropriate 
trial court. 
Although section 1759 of the Public Utilities Code provides 
that no court, except the Supreme Court to the extent speci-
fied, shall have jurisdiction to suspend or delay the execution 
or operation of any order or decision of the commission, the 
prohibition clearly refers to orders or judgments entered for 
the purpose of suspending or delaying the execution or opera- ,. 
tion thereof and does not encompass suspensions or delays , 
incidental to action which the court has jurisdiction to take., .. 
In the present case, respondent court has jurisdiction to 
determine the issues raised by the pleadings, and the fact that ;, 
some delay in execution of orders of the commission may inci- ; 
dentally result pending determination, of those issues is im-
material. 
The apparent purpose of the present action is to assure 
that the refunds ordered by the commission will be made only 
to persons entitled thereto. Since such a purpose would be 
in harmony with the official duties of the commission, action 
taken by respondent court in furtherance thereof would not 
*Section 2106 of the Public Utilities Code provides, in part: II A:ar 
public utility which does, causes to be done, or permits any act, matter, 
or thing prohibited or declared unlawful, or which omits to do any act, 
matter, or thing required to be done, either by the Constitution, any law 
of this State, or any order or decision of the commission, shall be liable 
to the perllons or corporations affected thereby for all loss, damages, or 
injury caused thereby or resulting therefrom. If the court finds that 
the act or omission was wilful, it may, in addition to the actual damages, 
award exemplary damages. An action to recover for such loss, damage, 
or injury may be brought in any court of competent jurisdiction by 8117 
eorporation or person. • • ." 
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"enjoin, restrain, or interfere with the commission in the 
performance of its official duties. " 
The commission places reliance on the reeent case of Pacific 
Tel. &- Tel. Co. v. Superior Court, 60 Ca1.2d 426 [34 Ca1.Rptr. 
673, 386 P.2d 233], in urging that' respondent court has no 
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the present action. In 
that case, however, the trial court would have been required 
to review an order of the commission, the validity thereof being 
specifically put in issue; and this court held that the scheme 
of review established by the Legislature would thereby be 
altered. In the present case, on the other hand, the validity 
of a commission order is not inv01ved. 
I would discharge the alternative writ of prohibition 
heretofore issued and deny the petition for a writ of prohibi-
tion. 
